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Abstract
We study the potential of cooperation in global emission abatements with multiple
externalities. Using a two-country model without side-payments, we identify the strategic
effects under different timing regimes of cooperation. We obtain a positive complemen-
tarity effect of long-term cooperation in abatement on R&D levels that boosts potential
benefits of long-term cooperation and a redistributive effect that destabilizes long-term
cooperation when countries are asymmetric. We show that whether and what type of
cooperation is sustainable, depends crucially on the kind rather than on the magnitude
of asymmetries.
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1 Introduction
One of the main global challenges of today is the problem of climate change. At its core lies
a public good’s problem which, by conventional economic wisdom, could simply be solved by
global cooperation that benefits all participants. In practice, however, simple global agreements
to curb the emission of greenhouse gases have been proven illusive (e.g., failure of the Copen-
hagen climate summit, or reluctance of the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto-protocol). This paper
contributes to a growing body of literature that tries to identify and understand the difficulties
in reaching such agreements.
Our starting point is the notion that multiple externalities are underlying the challenge of
climate change. First, countries may resort to abatement efforts and thereby reduce directly
those emissions that are held responsible for anthropogenic climate change. Second, countries
may invest in R&D activities and thereby develop new production techniques that reduce the
emissions intensity of output. Both types of activities exhibit strong externalities globally;
countries benefit directly from each other’s abatement efforts through a reduction in global
emissions, and from each other’s R&D efforts indirectly through knowledge spill-overs that re-
duce their abatement costs. Yet, irrespective of the double public goods problem, international
climate negotiations focus primarily on reaching agreements on emission levels.1
Given that both abatement and R&D efforts are crucial when tackling the issue of climate
change, the goal of this paper is to understand how both types of externalities affect the po-
tential for agreements. Distinguishing between direct abatement efforts and R&D investments,
we are able to address also the timing of cooperation. Because the implementation of R&D
requires more time than the implementation of abatement efforts, countries may cooperate in
their choice of future abatement levels either before or after they invest in R&D. We, therefore,
distinguish between early cooperation where countries commit to long-term abatement targets
before they invest in R&D, and late cooperation where countries first invest in R&D, and at a
later stage sign a short-term climate treaty. Highlighting this temporal dimension in the design
of climate agreements, we are able to identify strategic incentives for delaying cooperation.
In order to analyze these issues, we consider a two-country game with environmental ex-
ternalities and knowledge spill-overs.2 To capture the practical difficulties of implementing
contingent side payments, we exclude them from our analysis. Furthermore, we assume that
1An economic explanation for this dichotomy is that agreements on R&D are harder to monitor than agree-
ments on emissions (see Beccherle and Tirole 2011, Golombek and Hoel 2008, Harstad 2010).
2Environmental policy design in the presence of innovation externalities is analyzed e.g. by Fischer et al.
(2003), Gerlagh et al. (2009), Golombek and Hoel (2004), Heal and Tarui (2010). See also Jaffe et al. (2005).
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countries can only cooperate in their level of emissions but not in their R&D efforts. Under
these assumptions, we analyze how environmental and R&D externalities affect outcomes and
can lead to a delay or a failure of cooperation.
Apart from identifying different strategic effects that can arise in the presence of the two
externalities, our main results are as follows. First, there is a positive complementarity effect of
long-term abatement commitments on R&D levels in the sense that agreements that implement
higher levels of abatement, also provide stronger incentives for R&D. In other words, long-
term agreements on abatement levels do not crowd out efforts in R&D. Second, the timing
of cooperation exhibits a redistributive effect that favors late cooperation. More specifically,
our results show that late (short-term) cooperation allows, via strategic choices of R&D levels,
to reallocate gains from cooperation. Hence, even if late cooperation yields lower aggregated
welfare than early (long-term) cooperation, a specific country may, due to this redistributive
effect, nevertheless prefer late to early cooperation. As a result, this country would veto any
early cooperation. The redistributive effect, therefore, destabilizes long-term cooperation. We
point out that this effect is linked to the absence of side payments and occurs only when
countries are asymmetric. However, we also demonstrate that already a small asymmetry can
sometimes be sufficient to induce a failure of early cooperation. Third, we highlight that it is the
type rather than the strength of asymmetries that generally matters for failures in cooperation.
In particular, early (long-term) cooperation may sometimes be sustainable even in the presence
of strong asymmetries. We demonstrate this for an extreme case of unidirectional externalities,
where one country exerts only an abatement externality, whereas the other country exerts
only an R&D externality. The presence of both externalities leads to a mutual dependency in
countries’ welfare that facilitates early cooperation. Intuitively, the country that benefits from
environmental spill-overs, signs a long-term agreement to induce the other country to accept
a higher abatement target as well. The country that benefits from knowledge spill-overs, at
the same time, is willing to accept this long-term abatement commitment to induce the other
country to subsequently invest more in R&D.
Economic literature offers multiple explanations for the difficulties in achieving climate
agreements. Barrett (1994) points out that, since climate stabilization is a public good, each
country prefers other countries to abate more, but may not benefit from contributing substan-
tially to this public good itself. As a result of this free-rider problem, only a small number
of countries may sign a climate treaty and especially so when the potential gains from coop-
eration are large. Hence, effective climate treaties that must be self-enforcing with respect to
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participation, are often not sustainable.3 Because we analyze cooperation between only two
players, we can abstract from these concerns. This enables us to highlight the role of multiple
externalities and asymmetries between countries as another important reason why cooperation
may fail.
A further strand of the literature has identified asymmetries in general as a possible imped-
iment to cooperation. If countries are asymmetric, then side-payments can play an important
role in the stabilization of cooperation (e.g., Barrett, 2001; Carraro et al., 2006; Harstad, 2007).
For various reasons, however, they may be hard to implement on a large scale, and financial
obligations may be difficult to enforce due to the sovereignty of countries and the lack of a
higher authority that can impose punishments upon countries. The difficulties of implementing
side-payments may, thus, destabilize cooperation among asymmetric countries due to the same
fundamental problems that make it difficult to overcome the free-rider problem. In line with
these observations, also our analysis highlights the role of asymmetries in achieving cooperation
in the absence of side-payments.
Some authors abstract from the various obstacles to cooperation, and instead assume that
there is an exogenous delay in cooperation. This allows them to identify possible adverse strate-
gic effects that can arise when cooperation cannot be achieved today, but is expected to succeed
at some point in the future. Buchholz and Konrad (1994) show that countries may choose tech-
nologies with inefficiently high abatement costs for strategic reasons, even when low-emission
technologies are available today at no additional cost. The reason is that a country may benefit
from committing itself to high marginal abatement costs in the future, if this induces other
countries to abate more. Beccherle and Tirole (2011) generalize this approach by introducing
costly investments into emission-reducing technologies or other activities that reduce future
abatement costs. Similar to Buchholz and Konrad (1994), they show that the anticipation of
future cooperation in the choice of abatement targets induces countries to invest less at an
earlier stage (before abatement targets are determined). This delay in cooperation can lead to
an outcome that, in terms of aggregate welfare, is inferior even to the fully non-cooperative
outcome. Because we investigate countries that may agree on future reduction targets already
before R&D levels are determined, our analysis extends these studies. In particular, we show
that, with a long-term commitment, the option to strategically under-invest in R&D vanishes,
because in this case countries effectively choose their R&D levels ex post, after they are already
3Contrasting results are presented by, for instance, Asheim and Holtsmark (2009), Froyn and Hovi (2008),
and Heitzig et al. (2011). For an overview, see also Finus (2008). Stressing different punishment strategies,
Barrett (1997) and Hoel and Schneider (1997) consider other possible remedies to this problem.
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committed to future abatement targets.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
In Section 3, we derive optimality conditions to characterize the outcome in the four different
cooperation regimes that we consider: full cooperation, no cooperation, early, and late cooper-
ation. In Section 4, we endogenize the timing of cooperation and identify the effects of different
kinds of asymmetries. In Section 5, we introduce a specification of our general model that is
especially suited for an application to climate agreements. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix collects all formal proofs.
2 Basic Model
Consider two countries i ∈ {1, 2} that choose emissions targets. The targets are measured in
terms of abatement of emissions relative to some “business-as-usual” scenario. The abatement
targets are denoted by ai ≥ 0. In addition, each country has the possibility to invest in R&D
in order to reduce the costs of abatement. Country i’s R&D effort is denoted by ri ≥ 0. Due
to environmental externalities, country i’s welfare may depend on overall abatement levels.
Furthermore, country i’s costs of abatement can, due to knowledge spill-overs, depend also on
the other country’s R&D effort. More specifically, country i’s welfare, which reflects the net
benefit of abatement, is denoted by Πi and given by
Πi(a1, a2, r1, r2) ≡ Bi(a1, a2)− Ci(ai, r1, r2), (1)
where Bi measures environmental benefits and Ci the abatement costs of country i, including
its R&D investment costs. In the absence of R&D spill-overs, Ci depends on ri but not on r−i.
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In line with Beccherle and Tirole (2011), we concentrate on benefit functions that are linearly
increasing:
Bi(ai, a−i) = ai + γ−ia−i,
where γ
−i ∈ [0, 1]. We say that country −i has a positive abatement externality on country
i if γ
−i > 0. In the extreme γ−i = 1, so that country −i’s abatement has the same effect on
4Harstad (2010) endogenizes the length of the commitment period in climate agreements. Using an infinite
time horizon, the model allows countries to interact and cooperate repeatedly. Even if countries are ex ante
symmetric, they can become asymmetric over time if they choose different investments in technology. However,
in the Markov perfect equilibrium identified by the author, countries remain symmetric. In contrast to this, we
focus more explicitly on the role of asymmetries, and analyze how they affect the stability and the timing of
cooperation when side-payments are not feasible.
5For the indices, by convention, let −i ≡ 2 if i = 1, and −i ≡ 1 if i = 2.
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country i as country i’s own abatement ai. The linear specification allows us to cleanly show
that direct interactions between abatement and R&D externalities already lead to strategic
delays in cooperation.6
We consider general cost functions Ci that are convex in (ai, r1, r2), so that the country’s
welfare function Πi is concave in (a1, a2, r1, r2). More specifically, we assume that cost functions
satisfy
∂Ci
∂ai
> 0,
∂2Ci
∂a2i
> 0,
∂2Ci
∂r2i
> 0,
∂Ci
∂r
−i
≤ 0, ∂
2Ci
∂r2
−i
≥ 0, ∂
2Ci
∂ri∂r−i
≥ 0, ∂
2Ci
∂ai∂ri
≤ 0, ∂
2Ci
∂ai∂r−i
≤ 0.
The intuition behind these conditions is straightforward. The condition ∂2Ci/∂ri∂r−i ≥ 0 for
instance captures the standard assumption that R&D efforts are strategic substitutes. The last
two conditions imply that R&D reduces (weakly) the marginal cost of abatement. We say that
country i has a positive R&D externality if ∂C
−i/∂ri < 0. Furthermore, we focus on the natural
case where the R&D externalities do not exceed their corresponding direct effects. That is, we
assume: ∂2Ci/∂r
2
i ≥ ∂2Ci/∂ri∂r−i, and |∂2Ci/∂ai∂ri| ≥ |∂2Ci/∂ai∂r−i|.
Focusing on the ongoing discussion of climate agreements, we consider countries that have
the possibility to cooperate in abatement efforts, but not in R&D (see Beccherle and Tirole,
2011; Golombek and Hoel, 2008; Harstad, 2010). We also follow the literature (e.g. Barrett,
2001; Harstad, 2007) by assuming that if countries agree to cooperate, then the abatement
targets are always chosen to maximize the total welfare of both countries: Π ≡ Π1 + Π2. We
thereby also abstract from any enforceability issues concerning these agreements. To capture the
difficulty of implementing conditional side-payments in practice, we rule out such side-payments
altogether. We say that a country has an incentive to cooperate, if its payoff from cooperation
exceeds its payoff without cooperation. If both counties have an incentive to cooperate, then
cooperation succeeds. In other words, cooperation fails as soon as one country does not have
an incentive to cooperate. This can occur when countries are asymmetric, because the benefits
of cooperation are, then, also shared asymmetrically. In the case of global climate agreements
these asymmetries are substantial. Hence, we are especially interested in identifying the role of
asymmetries in the success and in the failure of achieving cooperation.
To understand how the presence of multiple externalities and the timing of cooperation
affect outcomes, our approach is to first analyze the following sub-cases independently:
6Concave benefit functions exhibit ∂2B(a1, a2)/(∂a1∂a2) < 0, which gives rise to what is known as the
“raising rivals’ costs effect” in industrial organization. This effect renders the analysis less tractable, while it
actually “magnifies the strategic incentive” (Beccherle and Tirole, 2011) of delay.
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1. Full cooperation: Countries choose (af
1
, af
2
, rf
1
, rf
2
) cooperatively to maximize the joint
surplus Π.
2. No cooperation: Countries first choose R&D levels (rn
1
, rn
2
) non-cooperatively, and subse-
quently choose the abatement levels (an
1
, an
2
) also non-cooperatively.
3. Early cooperation: Countries first commit to long-term cooperative abatement levels
(ae
1
, ae
2
) and subsequently choose R&D levels (re
1
, re
2
) non-cooperatively.
4. Late cooperation: Countries first choose R&D levels (rl
1
, rl
2
) non-cooperatively and then
choose short-term abatement levels (al
1
, al
2
) cooperatively.
The first two cases represent benchmarks which we use in order to evaluate the outcomes under
early and late cooperation. Overall, the analysis of these cases enables us to identify and
to classify the interactions of the different spill-over effects under different, exogenously-given
timing regimes.
In a second step, we then study the cooperation and timing decision by considering an
overall game where the choice whether to cooperate early, late, or not arises endogenously and
is part of the overall equilibrium outcome. The following figure illustrates the time structure
of this overall game:7
Figure 1
Intuitively, if countries do not agree to cooperate (neither early nor late), then first the
R&D levels are chosen non-cooperatively, and subsequently the abatement levels are chosen
non-cooperatively. Underlying this sequence of events is the assumption that R&D is a time-
consuming process, so current R&D efforts reduce future abatement costs. The abatement
levels a1 and a2 in our model, thus, refer to some future period of time. Near-term abatement
(before R&D levels are chosen) is not explicitly modeled.8 If countries cooperate, then they
transfer their abatement choice to a hypothetical planner who seeks to maximize total welfare.
Under early cooperation, the planner takes into account how the assigned long-term abatement
targets will affect also countries’ non-cooperative choice of R&D efforts. Conversely, if countries
7The dotted line at the bottom left of the figure indicates that the implementation of the chosen abatement
levels under early cooperation is not a decision.
8Underlying this approach is the implicit assumption that near-term abatement efforts do not interact
strongly with the variables of the model. See also Beccherle and Tirole (2011).
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cooperate late, they fully anticipate in the R&D stage how their choices will affect abatement
targets later in the cooperative stage. Cooperation in a certain stage fails, as soon as one
country rejects it. A country rejects early cooperation when it expects to gain more from later
or no cooperation. A country rejects late cooperation when it expects more from rejecting it.
3 Optimality Conditions
In this section, we derive optimality conditions that characterize an interior solution for each
of the four cases: 1. full cooperation, 2. no cooperation, 3. early cooperation, and 4. late
cooperation. We show how these optimality conditions capture the different strategic effects
that arise in the presence of the two externalities under early, late, and no cooperation. The
optimality conditions enable us to characterize inefficiencies that arise in the absence of full
cooperation, and to state comparative welfare results.
3.1 Full cooperation
Under full cooperation, countries maximize the joint surplus Π. Hence, they solve the following
maximization problem: maxa1,a2,r1,r2 Π(a1, a2, r1, r2). Because the target function is concave,
the cooperative solution (af
1
, af
2
, rf
1
, rf
2
) must satisfy the following first-order conditions:9
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1 + γi. (2)
∂Ci
∂ri
+
∂C
−i
∂ri
= 0. (3)
These optimality conditions are intuitive. The first condition requires that country i’s marginal
abatement cost equals its aggregated marginal benefit of abatement. The second condition says
that the aggregated abatement costs are minimized over ri. Both abatement and R&D spill-
overs are fully internalized. Due to the convexity of Ci, expression (2) indicates that the
presence of an abatement externality (γi > 0) implies more abatement. Similarly, expression
(3) shows that knowledge spill-overs from R&D (∂C
−i/∂ri < 0) imply higher levels of R&D.
3.2 No cooperation
Under no cooperation, countries play a sequential game. In the first stage, they simultaneously
choose their R&D efforts. In the second stage, they choose their abatement levels. We study
9For an ease of notation, functional dependencies are usually suppressed.
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the subgame perfect equilibrium of this non-cooperative extensive form game by backward
induction.
In the second stage R&D levels (r¯1, r¯2) are given and country i’s reaction function follows
from maximizing its payoff Πi(a1, a2, r¯1, r¯2) w.r.t. ai. The first-order conditions are
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1.
In order to signify that the equilibrium in stage 2 depends on (r1, r2), we write (a
n
1
(r1, r2),
an
2
(r1, r2)).
In the first stage, countries choose their R&D levels (r1, r2) while anticipating the outcome
in the second stage. Hence, each country expects the payoff
Πi(a
n
1
(r1, r2), a
n
2
(r1, r2), r1, r2).
By the Envelope Theorem, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium solves the system
dΠi
dri
=
∂Πi
∂ri
+
∂Πi
∂a1
∂an
1
∂ri
+
∂Πi
∂a2
∂an
2
∂ri
= −∂Ci
∂ri
+
∂Bi
∂a
−i
∂an
−i
∂ri
= 0.
To summarize, the non-cooperative outcome (an
1
, an
2
, rn
1
, rn
2
) solves for i = 1, 2:
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1, (4)
∂Ci
∂ri
= γ
−i
∂an
−i
∂ri
. (5)
Condition (4) indicates that in stage 2 each country chooses its abatement level ai such that the
individual (instead of the aggregated) net benefit is maximized. Hence, abatement externalities
are neglected. Comparing the left-hand side of (3) to (5) reveals that, without cooperation,
countries neglect R&D spill-overs. This negatively affects R&D efforts.
More interesting is the right-hand side of (5), which identifies a strategic double spill-over
effect that may actually increase R&D incentives. To understand the intuition behind this
effect, observe that by raising its R&D effort ri, the R&D externality will induce the other
country to raise its abatement level a
−i from which the original country benefits through the
abatement spill-over. Hence, this effect occurs only if there are spill-overs in both R&D and
abatement. The following lemma confirms that this double spill-over effect tends to raise R&D
efforts. Hence, it mitigates the aforementioned negative effect on R&D efforts.
Lemma 1 In the presence of both an abatement and an R&D externality, there is a strategic
double spill-over effect that tends to increase R&D incentives.
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To summarize, we identify three qualitatively different effects by which the outcome under
no cooperation differs from the outcome under full cooperation: 1. the neglect of abatement
externalities, 2. the neglect of R&D externalities, 3. a double externality effect that raises R&D
incentives. The first two effects are straightforward and, respectively, lower the incentives for
abatement and R&D. The third effect is more subtle and mitigates the second effect.10
3.3 Early cooperation
Under early cooperation, countries first commit to long-term abatement choices (ae
1
, ae
2
) coop-
eratively and subsequently choose their R&D levels (re
1
, re
2
) non-cooperatively. In the spirit of
subgame perfection, we analyze the cooperative levels (ae
1
, ae
2
) that maximize the joint surplus
Π under full anticipation of how the countries react to these abatement levels in stage 2 when
choosing their R&D levels non-cooperatively. More specifically, the reaction to abatement levels
(a¯1, a¯2) is a Nash equilibrium in R&D levels (r
e
1
, re
2
) that solves (for i = 1, 2)
∂Πi(a¯1, a¯2, r1, r2)
∂ri
= 0. (6)
In stage 1, the cooperation levels (ae
1
, ae
2
) therefore solve
max
a1,a2
Π(a1, a2, r
e
1
(a1, a2), r
e
2
(a1, a2)).
By the Envelope Theorem, the first-order conditions yield for i = 1, 2
∂Π
∂ai
+
∂Π2
∂r1
∂re
1
∂ai
+
∂Π1
∂r2
∂re
2
∂ai
= 0.
To summarize, the solution under early cooperation (ae
1
, ae
2
, re
1
, re
2
) satisfies the system
∂Ci
∂ri
= 0, (7)
∂Ci
∂ai
+
∂C
−i
∂ri
∂rei
∂ai
+
∂Ci
∂r
−i
∂re
−i
∂ai
= 1 + γi. (8)
Comparing (5) to (7) reveals that also with early cooperation countries fully neglect knowl-
edge spill-overs in their choice of R&D levels in stage 2. Hence, just as in the case without
any cooperation each country minimizes its own abatement costs, given its abatement target
assigned in stage 1. On the right-hand side of (8), we see the aggregated marginal benefit
of abatement, because countries cooperate in stage 1. On the left-hand side, we observe the
10Related results are presented by Golombek and Hoel (2004).
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marginal abatement cost of country i, plus two strategic effects which are both related to the
R&D externality.
The first of these effects indicates that the abatement target assigned to country i in the
cooperative stage is raised in case of positive R&D spill-overs (∂C
−i/∂ri < 0). Intuitively, by
assigning a higher abatement target to country i, additional R&D investments by this country
are triggered in the non-cooperative stage. This leads to spill-overs that reduce country −i’s
abatement costs. Hence, this strategic effect alleviates the inefficiency resulting from knowledge
spill-overs that are not internalized in stage 2.
The other strategic effect implies that, in the presence of R&D spill-overs (∂Ci/∂r−i <
0), abatement levels are reduced in the cooperative stage. Intuitively, by assigning a higher
abatement target to country i, higher R&D investments by this country are triggered. Because
R&D efforts are strategic substitutes, they partially crowd-out R&D investments by country
−i. This reduces the positive spill-overs from country −i’s R&D upon country i’s abatement
costs. To reduce this negative side effect, ai is reduced in the cooperative stage.
The next lemma shows that, overall, these strategic effects are (weakly) raising total welfare.
Moreover, under symmetry, early cooperation in abatement levels induces higher R&D efforts
chosen by both countries. Hence, even though there is no direct cooperation in R&D, early
cooperation in abatement partially offsets the lack of cooperation in R&D. It, in particular,
implies that long-term cooperation in abatement does not lead to a crowding-out in R&D
efforts. Hence, under early cooperation, abatement and R&D act as complements rather than
substitutes. As a result, we identify the complementarity effect of early cooperation.
Lemma 2 There are two strategic effects under early cooperation, which together tend to in-
crease aggregate welfare. If countries are symmetric, they induce higher R&D levels for each
country in the non-cooperative stage, by assigning higher abatement targets in the cooperative
stage.
To summarize, we identify three qualitatively different effects by which the outcome under
early cooperation differs from the outcome under full cooperation: 1. the neglect of R&D
externalities; 2. a complementarity effect of abatement that raises R&D incentives; 3. a
crowding-out effect that lowers R&D incentives, but which does not offset the aforementioned
complementarity effect of abatement.
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3.4 Late cooperation
Under late cooperation, countries first choose their R&D levels (rl
1
, rl
2
) non-cooperatively and
subsequently choose their abatement levels (al
1
, al
2
) cooperatively by signing a short-term agree-
ment to maximize the joint surplus Π. Hence, given R&D levels (r¯1, r¯2), the abatement levels
(al
1
, al
2
) solve
∂Π
∂ai
= 0. (9)
This yields abatement levels al
1
(r1, r2) and a
l
2
(r1, r2) as functions of R&D levels.
In the first stage, countries play a Nash equilibrium in R&D levels, anticipating the coop-
erative abatement levels
(
al
1
(r1, r2), a
l
2
(r1, r2)
)
in stage 2. Country i’s maximization problem is
maxri Πi (a1(r1, r2), a2(r1, r2), r1, r2). This yields the first-order conditions:
∂Πi
∂ri
+
∂Πi
∂ai
∂ali
∂ri
+
∂Πi
∂a
−i
∂al
−i
∂ri
= 0 ⇔ ∂Ci
∂ri
=
[
∂Bi
∂ai
− ∂Ci
∂ai
]
∂ali
∂ri
+
∂Bi
∂a
−i
∂al
−i
∂ri
.
Using (9), we can simplify this condition so that we can characterize the solution under late
cooperation (al
1
, al
2
, rl
1
, rl
2
) by the system
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1 + γi, (10)
∂Ci
∂ri
= γ
−i
∂al
−i
∂ri
− γi∂a
l
i
∂ri
. (11)
Condition (10) coincides with (2) if the fixed R&D levels r¯1 and r¯2 are the same. However,
condition (11), which determines the R&D levels, differs from the optimality condition in the
full cooperative case (3). As under early cooperation, countries neglect knowledge spill-overs in
their choice of R&D levels. As compared to (3), the optimality condition (11), therefore, lacks
the derivative ∂C
−i/∂ri on its left-hand side. On the right-hand side, we observe two strategic
effects that depend on the interaction between the abatement and the R&D externality. The
first effect, γ
−i∂a
l
−i/∂ri, tends to increase R&D incentives. Intuitively, if country i raises its
R&D effort in stage 1, this induces country −i to abate more in the cooperative stage due to
knowledge spill-overs that reduce its marginal abatement costs. In the presence of abatement
externalities, this positively affects country i’s own welfare and, hence, increases its R&D
incentives. In contrast, the second effect, −γi∂ali/∂ri, lowers R&D incentives. Intuitively,
each country has an incentive to enter the cooperative stage with high marginal abatement
costs, because this implies that it will be assigned a lower abatement effort. This strategic
commitment effect reduces a country’s R&D incentives. The next lemma shows that, under
12
symmetric abatement externalities, the two effects work in opposite directions, but the overall
effect lowers R&D incentives.
Lemma 3 In stage 1 of the late cooperation game, there are two strategic effects. If abatement
externalities are symmetric (γ1 = γ2), they work in opposite directions. The overall effect,
however, leads to lower investments in R&D, and, thus, reduces total welfare.
To summarize, we identify three qualitatively different effects by which the outcome un-
der late cooperation differs from the outcome under full cooperation: 1. the neglect of R&D
externalities; 2. a strategic commitment effect that lowers R&D incentives; 3. a double exter-
nality effect that raises R&D incentives but does not offset the second effect when abatement
externalities are not too asymmetric.11
3.5 Comparisons
In the following, we use our previous findings to derive some comparative welfare results.
Proposition 1 Without R&D externalities, early cooperation leads to the full cooperative out-
come.
To understand this result note that, in the absence of R&D externalities, there are no
potential gains from cooperation in terms of R&D. Hence, also under full cooperation, given
the assigned abatement target, each country minimizes its own abatement costs. But this is
also achieved under early cooperation.
Proposition 2 Without abatement externalities, the outcome under late cooperation coincides
with the outcome under no cooperation so that early cooperation is welfare superior to late
cooperation.
In the absence of abatement externalities, there are for any fixed R&D levels no potential
gains from cooperation. Hence, late cooperation has no effect upon the final outcome when
compared to no cooperation. Early cooperation, however, can achieve welfare gains because
the hypothetical planner in stage 1 can, by assigning higher abatement targets to each country
in stage 1, trigger additional R&D spill-overs in stage 2.
Proposition 3 If abatement externalities are symmetric, early cooperation induces a higher
total welfare than late cooperation.
11By continuity, the assumption of symmetric abatement spill-overs (γ1 = γ2) in Lemma 3 can be replaced
by the requirement that abatement externalities are not too asymmetric.
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Proposition 3 extends the results from Propositions 1 and 2 to situations where there exist
both abatement and R&D externalities. At first sight, one may think that early cooperation
should always dominate late cooperation in terms of aggregate welfare. Yet, the proposition
has the qualifier that abatement externalities are symmetric. This begs the question whether
we can actually dispense with this qualifier. Clearly, by continuity the proposition will hold
also for small asymmetries, but our next example shows that, with large asymmetries, early
cooperation can yield a lower aggregate welfare than late cooperation.
The example considers an extreme asymmetry in abatement and R&D externalities. In
particular, suppose country 1 benefits only from abatement by country 2, whereas country 2
does not benefit from any abatement at all: B1(a1, a2) = a2 and B2(a1, a2) = 0. Moreover,
suppose country 1 does not benefit from R&D spill-overs, while country 2 benefits only from
the R&D spill-overs from country 1 and not from its own R&D effort: C1(a1, r1, r2) = r
2
1
+ a1
and C2(a2, r1, r2) = a
3
2
/(1 + 2r1) + r2.
12 In this example, country 1’s abatement induces only
costs but no benefits. Independent of cooperation, its optimal level is therefore zero: a1 = 0.
Similarly, R&D of country 2 induces only costs. Hence, country 2 never exerts any positive
R&D effort: r2 = 0. Using a1 = r2 = 0, the payoff functions of the two countries simplify to:
Π1 = a2 − r21 and Π2 = −a32/(1 + 2r1). We next show how the abatement level a2 and R&D
level r1 depend on the timing of cooperation.
Under early cooperation, the abatement levels are fixed at the R&D stage, and because
R&D is only costly to country 1, it optimally chooses r1 = 0. Given that country 1 exerts no
R&D effort, the optimal level of abatement under early cooperation maximizes a2 − a32, which
yields a2 =
√
3/3 ≈ 0.58. This outcome yields aggregate welfare of approximately 0.38.
Under late cooperation, the abatement levels are chosen after the R&D efforts and, in
contrast to early cooperation, country 1 now has an incentive to invest in R&D in order to
reduce country 2’s costs of abatement and, thereby, trigger a higher abatement level at the
cooperative stage. Indeed, given some R&D effort r1, late cooperation leads to a2 =
√
3 + 6r1/3.
Anticipating this level of abatement, it is optimal for country 1 to choose an R&D level of
r1 ≈ 0.42, resulting in a total welfare of approximately 0.43 > 0.38.
This counter-intuitive example, where late cooperation outperforms early cooperation, is
best understood by recalling the different strategic effects of early versus late cooperation. The
example is constructed in such a way that only the double externality effect that raises R&D
12Alternatively, think of country 1 as a country that benefits also from its own abatement but faces pro-
hibitively high marginal abatement costs. Hence, this country never chooses a positive a1. Similarly, country 2
can be interpreted as one with prohibitively high marginal R&D costs.
14
incentives under late cooperation is active, while under early cooperation, the planner is unable
to trigger any positive R&D effort by country 1. Hence, only with late cooperation incentives
for R&D are present and this results in higher aggregate welfare.
Finally, we also point out that there is no unambiguous ranking in total welfare of late
cooperation versus no cooperation. Indeed, late cooperation can sometimes lead to a lower
aggregated welfare than no cooperation. This is the case if the strategic incentive to enter
the cooperative stage with high marginal abatement costs is sufficiently strong and induces
more distortions than in the non-cooperative case, where neither environmental externalities
nor knowledge spill-over effects are internalized. In a setup with side-payments, Beccherle and
Tirole (2011) obtain a similar result.
4 The Endogenous Timing of Cooperation
In this section, we address the countries’ incentives concerning the different stages of coopera-
tion. In order to endogenize the timing of cooperation, we can no longer analyze the different
timing games separately. It may be, for instance, that one of the countries prefers not to coop-
erate in the early stage, because it expects a better deal under late cooperation. Consequently,
we must perform an integrated analysis of both early and late cooperation.
Because one of the paper’s main interests lies in the interaction of abatement and R&D
spill-overs, we focus in particular on the effects of asymmetries in spill-overs. Asymmetric spill-
overs may arise for different reasons. For instance, countries may be asymmetric with respect
to their technological state in that one country is a technological leader, while the other is a
follower. In this case, knowledge spill-overs will mostly be unidirectional, from the leader to
the follower. Similarly, asymmetries in abatement spill-overs may exist when some countries
are, due to their specific location, particularly vulnerable to climate change, while others are
less affected, or when one country attaches a higher value to this problem. A classical example
of such asymmetries would be two countries that share a river, with one country being located
upstream and the other one downstream. Under unilateral environmental externalities, one
country benefits from increased abatement efforts by the other country, but not vice versa.
4.1 Unilateral externalities
In this subsection, we study extreme asymmetries in spill-over effects in the form of unilateral
externalities, where only one country generates a given type of spill-over. We first address the
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stability and the timing of cooperation under such unilateral externalities:
Proposition 4 Cooperation always fails when there is only a unilateral abatement external-
ity but no R&D externality, or when there is a unilateral R&D externality but no abatement
externality.
Intuitively, when there is only a unilateral externality in either abatement or R&D, then the
welfare of the country that generates the externality does neither depend on the abatement nor
on the R&D choice of the other country. It therefore can attain its maximum welfare without
cooperation. Hence, when cooperation does change the final outcome, then this country loses
from cooperation and, therefore, has an incentive to veto it.
Proposition 5 When there is both a unilateral abatement and a unilateral R&D externality,
cooperation fails if both externalities positively affect the same country. If each of the external-
ities affects a different country, then late cooperation fails, while early cooperation can succeed
if both externalities are of comparable strength.
Proposition 5 demonstrates that for early cooperation to work, both unilateral effects must
be sufficiently strong. To understand the intuition behind this result observe that in the absence
of an R&D externality, the country that generates the abatement externality, say country
1, always rejects to cooperate, because it would be assigned a higher abatement level under
cooperation, which reduces its welfare. Conversely, in the absence of an abatement externality,
country 2 rejects to cooperate, because it is assigned a higher abatement level by the planner in
order to induce this country to invest more in R&D. By continuity, one can find intermediate
cases where both effects keep each other in balance so that both countries benefit from early
cooperation.
4.2 Asymmetric spill-overs and the timing of cooperation
In order to illustrate how asymmetries in spill-overs affect the success and timing of cooperation,
we now introduce a specific version of our general model. This specification allows us to derive
closed-form solutions for all cases, but is nevertheless rich enough to provide some general
insights regarding the timing of cooperation.
Let the cost function of country i have the following form
Ci(ai, ri, r−i) = a
2
i + r
2
i − (1 + ai)ri − λ−ir−i,
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where λ
−i ∈ [0, 1] measures the R&D externality of country −i on country i. Country i’s payoff
under this specific cost function is
Πi(a1, a2, r1, r2) = ai − a2i + ri − r2i + airi + γ−ia−i + λ−ir−i.
This function is symmetric with respect to ai and ri. Hence, the interpretation of these variables
as abatement and R&D is, at this general level, arbitrary. In principle, they could reflect any
type of activities that cause externalities. What distinguishes these two variables is only the
assumption that countries can cooperate in their choice of (a1, a2) but not in their choice of
(r1, r2).
As an aggregate measure of the externalities caused by country i, it is useful to define
µi ≡ (γi + λi)2 + 2γiλi.
If country i does not exert an abatement externality (γi = 0), it follows that µi = λ
2
i . Conversely,
when λi = 0 then µi = γ
2
i . Under the above assumptions, the following results are obtained in
a straightforward manner:
1. Full cooperation:
afi =
3 + 2γi + λi
3
and rfi =
3 + γi + 2λi
3
;
Πfi = 1 + γ−i + λ−i +
µ
−i + (γ−i − λ−i)2
3
− µi + (γi − λi)
2
6
; (12)
Πf = 2 + γ1 + γ2 + λ1 + λ2 +
µ1 + (γ1 − λ1)2
6
+
µ2 + (γ2 − λ2)2
6
.
2. No cooperation:
ani = 1 and r
n
i = 1;
Πni = 1 + γ−i + λ−i; (13)
Πn = 2 + γ1 + γ2 + λ1 + λ2.
3. Early cooperation:
aei =
3 + 2γi + λi
3
and rei =
3 + γi + λi/2
3
< rfi ;
Πei = 1 + γ−i + λ−i +
(2γ
−i + λ−i)
2
6
− (2γi + λi)
2
12
; (14)
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Πe = 2 + γ1 + γ2 + λ1 + λ2 +
(2γ1 + λ1)
2
12
+
(2γ2 + λ2)
2
12
.
4. Late cooperation:
ali = 1 + γi/2 and r
l
i = 1 = r
n
i ;
Πli = 1 + γ−i + λ−i + γ
2
−i/2− γ2i /4; (15)
Πl = 2 + γ1 + γ2 + λ1 + λ2 + γ
2
1
/4 + γ2
2
/4.
Using these results, we obtain the following ranking of aggregated payoffs:
Πf ≥ Πe ≥ Πl ≥ Πn.
Using (14) and (15), we find that country i prefers early cooperation over the late cooperation
outcome if Πei −Πli = (2µ−i−µi)/12 > 0, hence, if µi < 2µ−i. In words, a country prefers early
over late cooperation if the positive externalities it causes (µi) are not more than twice the size
of the externalities caused by the other country (µ
−i). Furthermore, using (13) and (15), we find
that country i prefers late cooperation over the non-cooperative outcome if γi <
√
2γ
−i, hence,
if the abatement externality it causes is not more than
√
2 times the size of the abatement
externality caused by the other country. Otherwise, late cooperation fails. However, early
cooperation may still succeed, but the reference case is then the non-cooperative rather than
the late cooperation outcome.13
Let us now apply the example to a case with two unilateral externalities. Suppose, country
1 benefits only from R&D spill-overs (γ1 > γ2 = 0), and country 2 benefits only from an
abatement externality caused by country 1 (λ2 > λ1 = 0). Using the above results, we find:
Πn
1
= 1 + λ2 , Π
n
2
= 1 + γ1;
Πe
1
= 1 + λ2 +
1
6
λ2
2
− 1
3
γ2
1
, Πe
2
= 1 + γ1 +
2
3
γ2
1
− 1
12
λ2
2
;
Πl
1
= 1 + λ2 − 1
4
γ2
1
, Πl
2
= 1 + γ1 +
1
2
γ2
1
.
Clearly, Πn
1
> Πl
1
, so that country 1 always rejects late cooperation. Hence, either early
cooperation succeeds, or the non-cooperative outcome is obtained. For early cooperation to
13Under other specifications of benefits and costs, a country can manipulate its R&D choice upwards when
early cooperation fails, in order to induce the other country to agree to late cooperation. This prevents some of
the efficiency losses under no cooperation. In the above example, however, this type of strategy is ineffective,
because (for any fixed r−i) the effect of a change in ri upon Π
l
−i and Π
n
−i is identical.
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succeed, it must hold that Πe
1
≥ Πn
1
, which yields the condition
√
2γ1 ≤ λ2. Similarly, the
condition Πe
2
≥ Πn
2
yields λ2 ≤ 2
√
2γ1. Overall, we find that early cooperation succeeds if
√
2γ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ 2
√
2γ1.
Hence, as Proposition 5 indicates, given two unilateral externalities that go in opposite direc-
tions, both externalities must be of comparable size for early cooperation to succeed. Otherwise,
the country that causes the stronger externality rejects early cooperation.
5 An Application to Global Warming
In the specific version of the model introduced above, many of the strategic effects identified in
Section 3 are actually zero. In this section, we introduce an alternative specification of benefit
and cost functions that seems suitable especially for an application of the model to the issue of
global warming.
For global warming, it is appropriate to set the abatement externality equal to one (γ1 =
γ2 = 1). Hence, the benefits of abatement for each country depend only on the aggregate level
of abatement: a ≡ a1 + a2. Furthermore, we will assume that also R&D is a pure public good,
highlighting the problem of knowledge spill-overs across countries (e.g. Jaffe et al. 2005). In
particular, we use the following cost function:
Ci(ai, ri, r−i) =
a2i
r
+ r2i ,
where r ≡ r1 + r2. Under this specification, country i’s investment cost in R&D is a quadratic
function of ri. Similarly, the abatement cost is quadratic in ai and declining in the aggregate
level of R&D. Contrary to the previous example, r
−i has an effect not only on country i’s total
cost, but also on its marginal abatement cost ∂Ci/∂ai. As a result, several strategic effects will
affect the outcome that were absent in the previous example.
The asymmetry we consider in this example is one where countries differ in their appreciation
of abatement. In particular, we assume the benefit functions
B1(a) = (1 + δ)a and B2(a) = (1− δ)a,
where δ ∈ [0, 1/2] assures an interior solution. If δ > 0, country 1 values abatement more
than country 2. Note, however, that the aggregated benefit B1(a) + B2(a) is always 2a. This
property allows us to derive closed-form solutions for all four cases:
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1. Full cooperation:
ani = 2 , r
n
i = 1;
Πf
1
= 1 + 4δ , Πf
2
= 1− 4δ; (16)
Πf = 2.
2. No cooperation:
an
1
=
(1 + δ)(3− δ2)
8
, an
2
=
(1− δ)(3− δ2)
8
, rn
1
=
3 + 2δ − δ2
8
, rn
2
=
3− 2δ − δ2
8
;
Πn
1
=
27 + 12δ − 22δ2 − 4δ3 + 3δ4
64
, Πn
2
=
27− 12δ − 22δ2 + 4δ3 + 3δ4
64
; (17)
Πn =
27− 22δ2 + 3δ4
32
.
3. Early cooperation:
aei = 216/125 = 1.728, r
e
i = 18/25 = 0.72;
Πe
1
= 108(1 + 4δ)/125 = 108Πf
1
/125, Πe
2
= 108(1− 4δ)/125 = 108Πf
2
/125; (18)
Πe = 216/125 = 108Πf/125.
4. Late cooperation14:
ali = 1, r
l
1
= 1/2 + δ, rl
2
= 1/2− δ;
Πl
1
= 3/4 + δ − δ2, Πl
2
= 3/4− δ − δ2; (19)
Πl = 3/2− 2δ2.
Using these results, we obtain the following ranking of aggregated payoffs:
Πf > Πe > Πl > Πn.
Endogenization of cooperation:
In order to obtain an endogenous outcome for the timing of cooperation, we consider the overall
game and solve it by backwards induction. The following lemma specifies the conditions under
which each individual country benefits from late cooperation rather than from rejecting it.
14The parameter restriction δ ∈ [0, 1/2] ensures that all non-negativity constraints are automatically satisfied.
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Lemma 4 Given the above specification of benefit and cost functions, late cooperation succeeds
iff δ < 3− 2√2 ≈ 0.17.
The lemma shows that late cooperation succeeds if countries are not too asymmetric. If
δ ≤ 0.17, the equilibrium payoffs are given by (19), and if δ > 0.17, they are given by (17).
When δ changes in a comparative statics sense, then at the critical value for δ, there is a
discontinuity. Note that when δ ≥ 0.17, late cooperation fails even if both countries would
prefer it to the non-cooperative outcome. The reason is that for δ ≥ 0.17, countries anticipate
that for any given R&D levels, late cooperation fails and, in anticipation of this, countries
choose the non-cooperative R&D levels according to expression (17).
Given these results, we can solve for the equilibrium outcome of the overall game. The next
proposition endogenizes the timing of cooperation, depending on the degree of asymmetry δ.
Proposition 6 Given the above specification of benefit and cost functions, early cooperation
succeeds iff δ < 0.047. Hence, if δ ∈ (0.047, 0.17), late cooperation succeeds, while early cooper-
ation fails. If δ > 0.17, the non-cooperative outcome is obtained.
The result of Proposition 6 is best understood by considering Figure 2. It shows country
2’s payoff when early cooperation succeeds and when it fails (using (17), (18), and (19)):
Figure 2
The aforementioned discontinuity at the location δ = 0.17 reflects - given that early cooper-
ation fails - the transition from the late cooperation outcome to the non-cooperative outcome.
The figure illustrates that only when δ is sufficiently small (δ < 0.047), early cooperation
succeeds, while late cooperation succeeds for a larger set of parameter values.
Hence, although early cooperation leads to a higher aggregated welfare than late coopera-
tion, country 2, for strategic reasons, rejects early cooperation already under a small degree of
asymmetry between countries. Under early cooperation, the hypothetical social planner who
fixes the countries’ future abatement targets assigns an equal abatement level to both countries
(due to the symmetry of the abatement cost functions). Under late cooperation, in contrast, the
assigned abatement targets depend on the countries’ previous investments in R&D. Therefore,
under late cooperation, the total costs of abatement (including R&D costs) can effectively be
redistributed between countries via their choice of R&D levels, which makes cooperation more
sustainable also for higher degrees of asymmetry (redistributive effect). This is not possible
under early cooperation. This suggests that an asymmetry in the countries’ appreciation of
21
abatement makes early cooperation less likely to occur, because it does not allow countries to
redistribute the efforts of abatement via the strategic choice of R&D levels. The redistribu-
tive effect, thus, favors late cooperation and destabilizes early cooperation when countries are
asymmetric.
6 Conclusion
The Tinbergen rule on public policy (e.g., Tinbergen 1952) tells us that in order to implement
multiple policy targets, at least one policy tool is required for each target. Applying this rule
to cooperation, one cannot expect a climate treaty that addresses only abatement targets to
attain the first-best outcome in the presence of multiple market failures such as environmental
externalities and knowledge spill-overs. Going beyond this classical Tinbergen rule, our analysis
shows that things can actually be much worse: (long-term) treaties that address only one
problem may fail to materialize at all and, therefore, yield no improvements whatsoever. We
demonstrated this feature in a stylized model of cooperation between two countries and two
externalities that act asymmetrically.
A pessimistic insight from our analysis is that even small asymmetries between countries
can cause failures in cooperation. Due to the redistributive effect, especially early (long-term)
cooperation is vulnerable to small asymmetries. The reason for this is that a delay in co-
operation can put one of the countries in a strategically more favorable position. A country
that benefits relatively less from climate protection can, via its strategic choice of R&D levels,
shift the burden of abatement costs towards the other country. This favors late (short-term)
cooperation, and makes it sustainable also for higher degrees of asymmetry.
On a more optimistic note, we identified a positive complementarity effect of long-term
abatement, so that long-term agreements on abatement levels do not crowd-out efforts in R&D.
Moreover, even strong asymmetries do not necessarily destabilize early cooperation. With
primarily unilateral externalities, for instance, where one country has (relatively) higher benefits
of abatement, while the other country benefits mostly from knowledge spill-overs, long-term
treaties are sustainable. Intuitively, early cooperation requires both countries to adopt more
ambitious abatement targets. Therefore, a country with higher benefits of abatement, such
as for instance an industrialized country with a relatively high willingness-to-pay for climate
stability, may agree to cooperate early in order to induce the other country to abate more
as well. Conversely, a country that benefits mostly from knowledge spill-overs, such as for
instance a developing country with a high potential for abatement, may agree to a long-term
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abatement target in order to induce the other country to subsequently invest more in R&D. This
interdependency in countries’ welfare in the presence of multiple market failures can actually
facilitate an early agreement on long-term emission targets. The general conclusion whether
asymmetries foster or impede cooperation is therefore that, in the context of asymmetries, type
rather than size matters.
Appendix
This appendix collects the formal proofs of the lemmas and propositions.
Proof of Lemma 1: Due to the convexity of Ci, it is to show that the right-hand side of
(5) is non-negative. In the presence of an abatement externality, we have γ
−i > 0 so that it
remains to be shown that ∂an
−i/∂ri ≥ 0. To determine the sign of ∂an−i/∂ri, we use the first-
order conditions (4) of stage 2 and insert the functions an
1
(r1, r2) and a
n
2
(r1, r2) that describe
the equilibrium outcome:
∂Ci(a
n
i (r1, r2), r1, r2)
∂ai
= 1.
These conditions are, by the definition of ani (r1, r2), fulfilled for any (r1, r2). Therefore, the
derivative w.r.t. r1 and r2 is zero. This yields in particular for r−i:
∂2Ci
∂a2i
∂ani
∂r
−i
+
∂2Ci
∂ai∂r−i
= 0.
Swapping the indices i and −i, we, thus, obtain:
∂an
−i
∂ri
= −
(
∂2C
−i
∂a
−i∂ri
)
/
(
∂2C
−i
∂a2
−i
)
.
Because by assumption ∂2Ci/∂ai∂r−i ≤ 0, the numerator is non-positive, and due to ∂2Ci/∂a2i >
0 the denominator is positive. Hence, ∂an
−i/∂ri is non-negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: To show that the overall strategic effect in stage 1 of the early
cooperation game increases total welfare, note that the hypothetical social planner who chooses
the abatement targets in stage 1 could neglect this effect. The outcome would then be defined
by the following system:
∂Ci
∂ri
= 0 and
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1 + γi.
However, the planner maximizes total welfare in stage 1, in full anticipation of the outcome in
stage 2. Therefore, total welfare is strictly higher whenever the strategic effect is included in
the planner’s decision-making and affects the final outcome.
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To show the second claim, note that the functions re
1
(a1, a2) and r
e
2
(a1, a2) that describe the
outcome of R&D competition in stage 2, are implicitly defined by the system ∂Ci(ai, r
e
1
(a1, a2),
re
2
(a1, a2))/∂ri = 0 for i = 1, 2 (see (7)). Differentiation w.r.t. ai yields
∂2Ci
∂ri∂ai
+
∂2Ci
∂r2i
∂rei
∂ai
+
∂2Ci
∂ri∂r−i
∂re
−i
∂ai
= 0 and
∂2C
−i
∂r2
−i
∂re
−i
∂ai
+
∂2C
−i
∂ri∂r−i
∂rei
∂ai
= 0.
From which follows:
∂rei
∂ai
=
(
− ∂
2Ci
∂ri∂ai
∂2C
−i
∂r2
−i
)
/
(
∂2Ci
∂r2i
∂2C
−i
∂r2
−i
− ∂
2Ci
∂ri∂r−i
∂2C
−i
∂ri∂r−i
)
;
∂re
−i
∂ai
=
(
∂2Ci
∂ri∂ai
∂2C
−i
∂ri∂r−i
)
/
(
∂2Ci
∂r2i
∂2C
−i
∂r2
−i
− ∂
2Ci
∂ri∂r−i
∂2C
−i
∂ri∂r−i
)
.
Given the assumptions ∂2Ci/∂r
2
i > 0, ∂
2Ci/∂ri∂r−i ≥ 0, and ∂2Ci/∂r2i ≥ ∂2Ci/∂ri∂r−i, the de-
nominator is always positive. Using ∂2Ci/∂ai∂ri ≤ 0 and ∂2Ci/∂ri∂r−i ≤ 0, we find that
∂rei /∂ai ≥ 0 and ∂re−i/∂ai ≤ 0. Using the condition ∂2Ci/∂r2i ≥ ∂2Ci/∂ri∂r−i, we find
∂rei /∂ai ≥
∣∣∂re
−i/∂ai
∣∣. If countries are symmetric, then ∂C
−i/∂ri = ∂Ci/∂r−i. The overall
strategic effect is, then, always non-positive, which (by (7) and (8)) implies higher abatement
and higher R&D levels than in the absence of the strategic effect. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Using γ = γ1 = γ2 and inserting the function a
l
i(r1, r2) into (10)
yields
∂Ci
(
ali(r1, r2), r1, r2
)
∂ai
= 1 + γ.
Taking the derivative w.r.t. ri and r−i, we obtain the following conditions:
∂2Ci
∂a2i
∂ali
∂ri
+
∂2Ci
∂ai∂ri
= 0 and
∂2Ci
∂a2i
∂ali
∂r
−i
+
∂2Ci
∂ai∂r−i
= 0.
After rearranging terms we find
∂ali
∂ri
= −
(
∂2Ci
∂ai∂ri
)
/
(
∂2Ci
∂a2i
)
and
∂ali
∂r
−i
= −
(
∂2Ci
∂ai∂r−i
)
/
(
∂2Ci
∂a2i
)
.
Using the regularity conditions ∂2Ci/∂a
2
i > 0, ∂
2Ci/∂ai∂ri ≤ 0, ∂2Ci/∂ai∂r−i ≤ 0, and
|∂2Ci/∂ai∂ri| ≥ |∂2Ci/∂ai∂r−i|, we find that ∂ali/∂ri and ∂ali/∂r−i are both non-negative, and
∂ali/∂ri ≥ ∂ali/∂r−i. Hence, we obtain for the overall strategic effect γ
(
∂al
−i/∂ri − ∂ali/∂ri
) ≤
0, which (by (11)) implies lower R&D efforts than in the absence of strategic effects. The
reduction in R&D-levels aggravates the problem of under-investments in R&D (relative to the
full cooperation case) and, therefore, unambiguously reduces total welfare. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1: Without R&D externalities we have ∂C
−i/∂ri = 0. Using (2)
and (3), the cooperative solution (af
1
, af
2
, rf
1
, rf
2
) is with i = 1, 2 characterized by
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1 + γi and
∂Ci
∂ri
= 0.
According to (7) and (8), early cooperation (ae
1
, ae
2
, re
1
, re
2
) is characterized by the system
∂Ci
∂ri
= 0 and
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1 + γi.
The result follows immediately because the two systems of optimality conditions coincide.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Without abatement externalities we have γ1 = γ2 = 0. Using
(4) and (5), the solution without cooperation, (an
1
, an
2
, rn
1
, rn
2
), solves for i = 1, 2
∂Ci
∂ai
= 1 and
∂Ci
∂ri
= 0.
Using (10) and (11), we find that the late cooperation outcome (al
1
, al
2
, rl
1
, rl
2
) is characterized
by the same system of optimality conditions. Hence, the outcome without cooperation and
with late cooperation are identical.
Early cooperation satisfies the system (7) and (8), which differs from the other system of
equations due to the presence of strategic effects. By ignoring them, the hypothetical planner
in stage 1 can assure a total welfare at least as large as under late or no cooperation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The outcome under late cooperation is characterized by the
system (10) and (11). According the Lemma 3, the overall strategic effect in stage 1 (see (11))
is welfare-reducing if γ1 = γ2. The outcome under early cooperation satisfies the system (7)
and (8), which differs from (10) and (11). According to Lemma 2, the overall strategic effect
in stage 1 (see (8)) is welfare-enhancing. The claim, thus, follows immediately from Lemma 2
and Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: To show that cooperation in the countries’ choices of abatement
targets fails when there is a unilateral abatement externality but no R&D externality, note that
the country that generates the abatement externality can achieve its own welfare maximum
without any cooperation. Hence, this country can never gain from cooperating. Although by
Proposition 1 early cooperation leads to a higher total welfare, the country that generates the
externality loses from cooperation as it is assigned an abatement effort above its individual
optimum.
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To show that cooperation fails when there is a unilateral R&D externality but no abatement
externality, note first that by Proposition 2 late cooperation in abatement yields no welfare
gains. Hence, for any fixed R&D levels, the option not to cooperate weakly dominates the
option to cooperate because by assumption countries only cooperate if at least one country gains
from cooperation. Furthermore, early cooperation fails, because the country that generates the
R&D externality has no gains from it. The planner assigns a higher abatement level to this
country in the cooperative stage (stage 1) in order to trigger additional R&D investments by
this country in stage 2. This reduces the welfare of this country that can achieve its own welfare
maximum without any cooperation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: To show the first claim, note that the country that generates
both externalities achieves its individual welfare maximum without any cooperation. Hence,
whenever cooperation affects the final outcome, it negatively affects this country’s welfare.
To show that late cooperation fails if each of the unilateral externalities affects a different
country, note that for fixed R&D levels, the country that generates the abatement externality
suffers from cooperation in stage 2. For any given R&D levels, it attains its individual welfare
maximum when ignoring the abatement externality. Hence, it rejects late cooperation.
To show that early cooperation succeeds if both externalities are sufficiently strong and each
affects a different country, rewrite the optimality conditions for early cooperation ((7) and (8))
for this case. Without loss of generality, suppose country 1 exerts an abatement externality on
country 2 but not vice versa (γ1 > γ2 = 0) and country 2 exerts an R&D externality on country
1 but not the other way around (∂C1/∂r2 < ∂C2/∂r1 = 0). Hence, we obtain:
∂Ci
∂ri
= 0,
∂C1
∂a1
+
∂C1
∂r2
∂re
2
∂a1
= 1 + γ1 and
∂C2
∂a2
+
∂C1
∂r2
∂re
2
∂a2
= 1.
From the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain the following expressions:
∂re
2
∂a2
=
(
− ∂
2C2
∂r2∂a2
∂2C1
∂r2
1
)
/
(
∂2C2
∂r2
2
∂2C1
∂r2
1
− ∂
2C2
∂r2∂r1
∂2C1
∂r2∂r1
)
;
∂re
2
∂a1
=
(
∂2C1
∂r1∂a1
∂2C2
∂r1∂r2
)
/
(
∂2C1
∂r2
1
∂2C2
∂r2
2
− ∂
2C1
∂r1∂r2
∂2C2
∂r1∂r2
)
.
Since C2 is not a function of r1, these expressions simplify to
∂re
2
∂a2
=
(
− ∂
2C2
∂r2∂a2
∂2C1
∂r2
1
)
/
(
∂2C2
∂r2
2
∂2C1
∂r2
1
)
and
∂re
2
∂a1
= 0.
Using the following regularity assumptions: ∂2Ci/∂r
2
i > 0 and ∂
2Ci/∂ai∂ri ≤ 0, we find that
∂re
2
/∂a2 ≥ 0. Hence, the product ∂C1/∂r2 · ∂re2/∂a2 is non-positive, which implies a higher
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abatement level a2 than in the absence of this strategic effect, and by ∂C2/∂r2 = 0 also a
higher R&D level r2. To summarize: under early cooperation and unilateral externalities, the
following conditions are fulfilled:
∂Ci
∂ri
= 0,
∂C1
∂a1
= 1 + γ1, and
∂C2
∂a2
−
(
∂C1
∂r2
∂2C2
∂r2∂a2
∂2C1
∂r2
1
)
/
(
∂2C2
∂r2
2
∂2C1
∂r2
1
)
= 1.
The expression γ1 on the right-hand side of the second equation induces a higher abatement
level a1 (as compared to no cooperation), and by ∂C1/∂r1 = 0 also leads to a higher R&D
level r1. The higher abatement levels (a
e
1
, ae
2
) increase country 2’s welfare that benefits from
the abatement externality, and the higher R&D levels (re
1
, re
2
) are beneficial to country 1 that
benefits from knowledge spill-overs. Hence, both countries can benefit from these effects if both
externalities are sufficiently strong. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: For any given R&D levels (r1, r2), late cooperation succeeds if both
countries achieve a higher welfare than in the absence of cooperation. Hence, late cooperation
succeeds if ∆Πln
1
(r1, r2) ≡ Πl1(r1, r2)−Πn1 (r1, r2) ≥ 0 and ∆Πln2 (r1, r2) ≡ Πl2(r1, r2)−Πn2 (r1, r2) ≥
0. Using the results from Section 3, it is straight-forward to derive the following expressions
for welfare (for fixed R&D levels (r1, r2)):
Πl
1
(r1, r2) = (1 + 2δ)(r1 + r2)− r21, Πl2(r1, r2) = (1− 2δ)(r1 + r2)− r22;
Πn
1
(r1, r2) = (3 + 2δ − δ2)(r1 + r2)/4− r21, Πn2 (r1, r2) = (3− 2δ − δ2)(r1 + r2)/4− r22.
This implies
∆Πln
1
= (1 + 6δ + δ2)(r1 + r2)/4 > 0 and ∆Π
ln
2
= (1− 6δ + δ2)(r1 + r2)/4.
Hence, country 1 is always willing to cooperate. Country 2 cooperates if 1−6δ+δ2 ≥ 0, which,
for the relevant interval δ ∈ [0, 1/2], yields the critical value 3− 2√2 ≈ 0.17. If δ is below this
value, it holds that ∆Πln
2
> 0. Note, that the critical value for δ is independent of r1 and r2.
Therefore, late cooperation succeeds iff δ ≤ 3− 2√2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: The result follows directly from a comparison of (17), (18), and
(19). Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Game tree 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Endogenization of cooperation 
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